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GEORGETOWN LAW TECHNOLOGY REVIEW 
 
TECHNOLOGY REGULATION BY DEFAULT: 
 PLATFORMS, PRIVACY, AND THE CFPB 
Rory Van Loo* 





In the absence of a technology-focused regulator, diverse 
administrative agencies have been forced to develop regulatory models for 
governing their sphere of the data economy. These largely uncoordinated 
efforts offer a laboratory of regulatory experimentation on governance 
architecture. This symposium essay explores what the Consumer Financial 
Protection Bureau (CFPB) has done in its first several years to regulate 
financial technology (“fintech”), in the context of broader technology-
related concerns identified in the literature.  
The CFPB offers an example of an agency that avoids some of the 
major potential institutional challenges that other regulators might face: 
susceptibility to capture, a lack of technological sophistication, and 
insufficient authority. Launched in 2011 with a “technocratic impulse,” 
the CFPB embraced its identity as a 21st century agency from the outset.1 
It opened a Twitter account and hired a large number of computer 
engineers before becoming operational, and has developed a suite of 
online digital tools for consumers. Compared to the Federal Trade 
Commission (FTC), the CFPB has more authority to write rules, impose 
civil penalties, and monitor what businesses are doing with algorithms. Its 
funding is independent of congressional appropriations, and its director 
can only be fired for cause. Granted, the CFPB has its own relative 
limitations, including a long list of important, post-financial-crisis needs 
waiting at its inception; strong political and industry resistance; and a 
																																								 																				
* Associate Professor of Law, Boston University; Affiliated Fellow, Yale Law School 
Information Society Project. For excellent research assistance, I am grateful to Daniela 
Abadi, Phoebe Dantoin, Amy Mills, Thomas Perkins, and Kelsey Sullivan. The author 
was on the implementation team that set up the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau. 
All information below is based on publicly available sources. 
1 K. Sabeel Rahman, Envisioning the Regulatory State: Technocracy, Democracy, and 
Institutional Experimentation in the 2010 Financial Reform and Oil Spill Statutes, 48 
HARV. J. LEGIS. 555, 557 (2011). 
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mission focused only on finance. The agency nonetheless offers a window 
into how a powerful, independent, and technologically savvy agency 
might regulate the data economy.  
The body of this essay begins with a survey of what the CFPB has 
undertaken using more traditional administrative agency tools—
enforcement and rulemaking—in areas such as privacy, consumer control 
over data, and regulatory sandboxes. It then looks at how the CFPB has 
used technology to protect consumers, through Twitter and online 
advisory tools. The essay closes by considering open questions, including 
the possibility of the CFPB’s privacy activities extending its oversight of 
tech giants like Facebook and Amazon, and the extent to which the CFPB 
might exercise additional authority to inspect financial algorithms. More 
systematic study of the agency’s activities is needed, but the CFPB’s early 
experiences both provide examples that other agencies might follow and 
indicate the difficulty of relying on industry-specific regulators to govern 
the data economy, rather than an agency focused on technology.  
 
I. CFPB ENFORCEMENT AND POLICYMAKING FOCUSED ON TECHNOLOGY 
 
In advancing its core consumer finance mission through 
enforcement and rulemaking, the CFPB has engaged with the data 
economy in a number of ways. Its enforcement actions have required it to 
look at how financial entities are using social media and algorithms to sell 
to consumers. The agency has become active in enforcing privacy matters. 
It has also taken steps toward improving data portability principles and 
building a regulatory sandbox.  
 
A.  Traditional Consumer Finance Violations 
 
The CFPB has pursued enforcement actions against fintech 
companies with innovative business models, ranging from Paypal to small 
startups. It issued a consent decree against one online lender, Think 
Finance, whose computer system had automatically debited borrowers’ 
accounts for payments that they did not legally owe and issued debt 
collection emails urging similar payments.2 In a separate action, the CFPB 
																																								 																				
2 Complaint at 12-13, Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau v. Think Fin., LLC, 2018 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 19480 (D. Mont. Nov. 15, 2017) (No. 4:17-cv-00127-BMM) [hereinafter Think 
Fin. Complaint].  
2018 GEORGETOWN LAW TECHNOLOGY REVIEW 533 
fined LendUp $3.6 million for deceptive practices including understating 
the annual percentage rate (APR).3  
Several inferences can be made from these cases. First, the CFPB 
is paying attention to social media. In its case against LendUp, the agency 
took issue with Facebook ads. LendUp had paid for “slider bars” on 
Facebook pages that users could move horizontally to gauge how payment 
terms would change at varying amounts and times. The CFPB found that 
those slider bars did not disclose the full APR and how the loan terms 
might change later.4 Exactly how the CFPB learned of this type of 
violation is unclear, but the agency has shown some willingness to hold 
new digital forms of advertisement to traditional standards.  
At a more theoretical level, the CFPB’s activities show the 
importance of code in the regulatory analysis. Think Finance, for instance, 
was selling loans online that had been originated by three other businesses, 
collectively referred to in the legal complaint as “Tribal lenders.” 5 The 
Tribal lenders provided key data inputs for the algorithm that Think 
Finance used to assign risk scores to consumers and to decide what risk 
score (the output) it would accept. The CFPB nonetheless decided that 
Think Finance’s control of the algorithm meant that it “controlled the 
Tribal lenders and ran the business.”6  
Part of the reasoning was that Think Finance refused to share the 
inner workings of the algorithm with the Tribal lenders. For the CFPB, it 
was not enough that another entity supplied the base product and made 
key decisions about the inputs and outputs. Even in finance, an industry 
defined by money, it is not necessarily the party owning the funds that has 
the power in a business partnership, but may instead be the party that 
controls the algorithmic “black box.”7 
  
B.  Data Security  
 
The CFPB took its first serious enforcement step into data security 
in 2016. The agency found that Dwolla, a money transfer platform like 
Venmo, had engaged in deceptive practices when Dwolla told its 
																																								 																				
3 Consent Order at 7, Flurish, Inc d/b/a LendUp, CFPB No. 2016-CFPB-0023 (Sept. 27, 
2016). 
4 Id. 
5 Think Fin. Complaint, supra note 2, at 9. 
6 Id. 
7 See generally FRANK PASQUALE, THE BLACK BOX SOCIETY: THE SECRET ALGORITHMS 
THAT CONTROL MONEY AND INFORMATION (Harv. Univ. Press ed., 2015).  
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customers that its data security protocol “surpass[ed] industry security 
standards.”8 In reality, as stated in the consent order, Dwolla “failed to 
employ reasonable and appropriate measures to protect data obtained from 
consumers from unauthorized access.”9  
It is difficult to know how far the CFPB will take its data security 
operations. It is worth noting, however, that the FTC today “is viewed as 
the de facto federal data protection authority.”10  It began paying close 
attention to this area in the 1990s.11 But the FTC did not need to receive 
any additional authority from Congress to ramp up its privacy enforcement 
significantly.12 Instead, it mostly used its basic unfair and deceptive acts 
authority it had received in the early 1900s.13 In other words, in becoming 
the de facto federal data protection authority, the FTC used authority that 
the CFPB has in consumer finance. Particularly given the political 
pressures on the CFPB and the broader political support for data security 
(a politically safe area of enforcement), it is possible that the CFPB will 
pay greater attention to this area in the future.  
 
C.  Data Portability  
 
Congress has mandated that the CFPB study how best to regulate 
the sharing of information between financial institutions and third parties 
when consumers authorize access. The issue is particularly important in 
light of the potential next generation of fintech platforms. Platforms such 
as Mint and Credit Karma have sought to analyze all credit card, bank 
account, and loan offerings to tell consumers when they should switch. 
Since credit is so personalized—dependent on spending patterns and FICO 
scores and other customer-specific features—advisory fintechs must have 
access to consumers’ private data to provide the best advice. Banks have 
put up obstacles to third-party access, thereby threatening to enfeeble 
fintech advisors.14 
																																								 																				
8 Consent Order at 5, Dwolla, Inc., CFPB No. 2016-CFPB-0007 (Mar. 2, 2016) 
[hereinafter Dwolla Consent Order].  
9 Id. at 6.  
10 Daniel J. Solove & Woodrow Hartzog, The FTC and the New Common Law of 
Privacy, 114 COLUM. L. REV. 583, 600 (2014). 
11 See id. at 598-600. 
12 See id. at 604-05 (noting that the FTC gained increasing regulatory power by slowly 
acquiring enforcement authority over federal privacy statutes). 
13 Id. at 599.  
14 See Rory Van Loo, Rise of the Digital Regulator, 66 DUKE L. J. 1267, 1286 (2017). 
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The CFPB, after studying the matter, issued a set of principles to 
serve as guidelines for the sharing of data, including that financial 
institutions should generally not prevent consumers from granting access 
to account information.15 When sharing happens, the regulated entity is 
advised to ensure that the data transfer is secure.  
The CFPB’s approach to data protection did not go as far as it 
could have because it declined to write formal rules. The extent to which 
its principles serve as de facto rules can be debated, but the agency 
emphasized that the principles were not interpretations and did not reflect 
future enforcement priorities.16  
The risk here is that banks and other financial institutions have too 
much leverage. With voluntary principles, banks have more leeway to 
erect barriers to data access. As a general matter, financial institutions 
serving customers have an incentive to limit third-party access, which 
makes their data more valuable. The CFPB’s decision to opt for voluntary 
compliance also means that fintechs must negotiate with banks to obtain 
the data access they need to help consumers. Although in theory banks 
should treat all third parties similarly, they have an incentive only to work 
with third parties that are not driving banks’ customers away. Fintechs that 
are dependent on financial institutions’ voluntary cooperation are 
presumably less likely to recommend that consumers move to other banks 
and credit card companies, even if doing so would be in the consumers’ 
best interests. Stated otherwise, the CFPB’s approach increases the 
chances that fintechs must serve banks rather than only consumers.  
By way of contrast, European authorities have required banks to 
give third parties far-reaching access to data upon consumer 
authorization.17 Fintech advisors in Europe will thus have greater ability to 
analyze consumers’ spending habits and credit profiles to provide helpful 
recommendations.  
In the Bureau’s defense, it was an odd choice by Congress to task 
the CFPB with studying the issue of data access. In Europe, the issue of 
																																								 																				
15 See CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, CONSUMER PROTECTION PRINCIPLES:  CONSUMER-
AUTHORIZED FINANCIAL DATA SHARING AND AGGREGATION (2017), 
http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/documents/cfpb_consumer-protection-principles_data-
aggregation.pdf [https://perma.cc/YE9Q-P79E].  
16 See id. 
17 EUROPEAN BANKING AUTH., REPORT ON INNOVATIVE USES OF CONSUMER DATA BY 
FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS 6 (2017), 
https://www.eba.europa.eu/documents/10180/1720738/Report+on+Innovative+uses+of+
data+2017.pdf [https://perma.cc/DY98-FF2U]. 
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data access was put in the hands of a regulator with competition authority. 
The CFPB does not have a traditional competition mandate.  
The choice of the CFPB, and its reluctance to push further, 
arguably reflects a design flaw in the financial regulatory architecture. As 
I have argued elsewhere, no agency has the right motivation, expertise, 
and authority to advance competition policy in consumer finance.18 The 
DOJ’s antitrust division has some responsibility for competition 
enforcement in finance, but lacks rulemaking authority, has no real 
finance-specific expertise, and defers to banking regulators. The banking 
regulators, such as the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC), 
have as their primary mission ensuring that big banks do not fail. That 
mission is in tension with helping fintechs advise consumers that better 
deals may lie elsewhere.19  
The CFPB was perhaps the best choice available in a regulatory 
structure that has a glaring hole for competition enforcement. Its handling 
of the data portability issue further underscores the importance of data 
economy regulators committed to promoting not just consumer protection, 
but also competition.20  
 
D.  Regulatory Sandbox 
 
Regulatory sandboxes aim to support innovation by enabling 
businesses to test new ideas in close communication with a regulator. To 
support fintech innovation, the CFPB launched Project Catalyst in 2016. 
This program’s goal is to ease concerns among startups that the CFPB 
might take enforcement actions in response to some new product or 
practice. To ease such potentially innovation-deterring concerns, the 
CFPB allows companies to ask for a no-action letter. Under this program, 
the CFPB would review a proposed technology and issue a letter stating its 
intent not to take an enforcement action.21  
																																								 																				
18 See Rory Van Loo, Making Innovation More Competitive: The Case of Fintech, 65 
UCLA L. REV. 1 (2017). 
19 See id. 
20 This is a project attracting the attention of many scholars. See, e.g., Lina M. Khan, 
Amazon's Antitrust Paradox, 126 YALE L.J. 710, 710 (2017); K. Sabeel Rahman, 
Domination, Democracy, and Constitutional Political Economy in the New Gilded Age: 
Towards A Fourth Wave of Legal Realism?, 94 TEX. L. REV. 1329, 1347 (2016). 
21 Policy on No-Action Letters; Information Collection, 81 Fed. Reg. 8,686, 8,692-93 
(Feb. 22, 2016). 
2018 GEORGETOWN LAW TECHNOLOGY REVIEW 537 
In its two years of existence, the program has only led to one no-
action letter.22 It is difficult to know how to interpret this lack of industry 
interest in the no-action letters. One possible explanation for these results 
could be a poorly designed program. For example, some have argued that 
the no-action letter provides insufficient legal protections and imposes 
burdensome information sharing.23 Another possible explanation is simply 
that startups are not worried about CFPB action against their new 
products.24 Still, the CFPB’s initiation of the program is a potential first 
step toward a broader experimentalist framework with stakeholder 
involvement from the technology sector.25 
 
II. CFPB USE OF TECHNOLOGY TOOLS 
 
The CFPB has used technologies to interface with consumers in a 
number of ways. It has built a suite of online tools that help consumers to 
make decisions. Consumers can also go to the CFPB’s website to submit 
complaints about financial institutions, and the agency has regularly 
tweeted to consumers, sometimes even in response to particular financial 
institutions’ behavior. 
 
A.  Online Decision Tools 
	
The CFPB has begun to offer a suite of online decision assistants. 
At the agency’s mortgage calculator website, for instance, people can 
enter a zip code, loan amount, and credit score to learn the interest rates 
that similarly situated borrowers paid for their mortgages. Through this 
mortgage calculator, the CFPB is offering services close to what a fintech 
startup might. It purchases the data it uses from private parties. For-profit 
companies, such as Quicken Loans, offer a variety of mortgage calculator-
type tools.26 Many of the private sector tools go further by listing actual 
products available and seeking to complete the purchase. But even the 
																																								 																				
22 Eric Mogilniki & Michael Nonaka, CFPB Has Opportunity to Reinvent Approach to 
Innovation, AMERICAN BANKER (Feb. 21, 2018, 9:30 AM), 
https://www.americanbanker.com/opinion/cfpb-has-opportunity-to-reinvent-approach-to-
innovation [https://perma.cc/9ZG9-ZURR].  
23 See, e.g., id. 
24 This possibility is consistent with the CFPB’s reluctance to pursue new types of digital 
harm. See infra Part III.A. 
25 On the broader role of sandboxes in fintech, see, e.g., Christopher G. Bradley, 
Fintech’s Double Edges, 93 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 61, 85-86 (2018). 
26 See id. 
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basic step of providing price information before the purchase is unusual 
for a government entity.  
Another way of conceptualizing the CFPB’s online offerings is as 
creating a digital regulator. These tools aim to help consumers protect 
themselves by making better decisions. Markets with informed consumers 
are, in theory, better able to self-regulate. 
As I have described in greater depth elsewhere, the CFPB’s 
entrance into the realm of Internet intermediaries raises questions about 
the evolving role of the regulatory state in the information age.27 How 
effective can the tools be given that the CFPB puts a tiny fraction of the 
resources into its mortgage calculator compared to private mortgage 
calculators? Should the writing of these tools’ computer code count as a 
kind of legal rulemaking, and thus go through notice and comment 
processes as some agencies have done with their online tools?28  
 
B.  The Complaint Database 
 
The CFPB hosts an online complaint database through which 
consumers can submit problems they have encountered with financial 
institutions.29 A consumer complaint database is not new. The FTC, for 
instance, has had its own consumer complaint tool for years. Both 
agencies use the complaints to detect violations. But the CFPB has gone 
farther than the FTC by forwarding complaints to the relevant institutions, 
and tracking whether a complaint was dealt with. The CFPB follows a 
model closer to that of the OCC, which contacts the institution on the 
complainer’s behalf and later sends a summary report of the results.30 
The one way in which the CFPB appears to have gone farther than 
its peer regulators is by publishing complaint data online. Anyone can 
view which companies have been subjected to CFPB complaints, read the 
complaint language, and even download complaint data for analysis. 
Industry fought this publication strenuously, but lost. As a result, the 
database arguably has a shaming component, or at least provides some 
																																								 																				
27 See Van Loo, supra note 18. 
28 See id. 
29 See Jean Braucher & Angela Littwin, Examination As A Method of Consumer 
Protection, 58 ARIZ. L. REV. 33, 70 (2016) (describing the CFPB’s complaint database). 
30 Office of Comptroller of the Currency, What You Can Expect From Us, 
HELPWITHMYBANK.GOV, https://www.helpwithmybank.gov/complaints/what-to-
expect/complaints-what-to-expect.html [https://perma.cc/GGB7-N4H3]. 
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public transparency that contrasts with the confidential nature of other 
regulators’ complaint databases.  
Like with its mortgage calculator, the complaint database is 
another area where the CFPB is offering an online tool that, to some 
extent, competes with the private sector. The many websites that allow 
consumers to rate and complain about firms may not forward on their 
complaints and receive responses with the same impact. But unlike in 
other industries, consumers have a choice of publicly venting their finance 
grievances on either a private or a governmental online platform.  
 
C.  Twitter Outreach 
 
The CFPB, like many agencies, has used Twitter as an outreach 
tool. It opened an account in January of 2011, several months before the 
agency’s official launch, and has since then tweeted over 3,000 times. 
Most of its tweets are educational, providing links and tips about choosing 
a mortgage, dealing with debt collectors, or talking to children about 
finance.31  
The agency has not generally used the account to call out specific 
companies. But it has, at times, gently mentioned some by name in the 
process of delivering an educational message, or to inform consumers how 
they can seek redress. In many identity theft protection tweets following 
the Equifax breach, for instance, it mentioned Equifax, TransUnion, and 
Experian a number of times in describing how those companies share 
people’s data.32 After reaching settlements with companies, the CFPB has 
also tweeted links and messages to let consumers know that they may be 
eligible for payments.33 When consumers tag the CFPB while criticizing a 
																																								 																				
31 See Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau (@consumerfinance.gov), TWITTER, 
https://twitter.com/CFPB [https://perma.cc/P4AD-KC4R]. 
32 See, e.g., Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau (@consumerfinance.gov), TWITTER (Feb. 1, 
2018, 11:00 AM), https://twitter.com/CFPB/status/959139289031413761 (mentioning 
that the list of credit reporting companies goes beyond Equifax, TransUnion, and 
Experian) [https://perma.cc/JB9W-GPPJ]. 
33 See, e.g., Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau (@consumerfinance.gov), TWITTER (Mar. 18, 
2018, 8:54 AM), https://twitter.com/CFPB/status/973950383667195905 (tweeting to 
RushCard users that they may be eligible for redress payments from the company); 
Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau (@consumerfinance.gov), TWITTER (Sept. 15, 2017, 7:35 
AM), https://twitter.com/CFPB/status/908700698962944000 (linking resources for 
participants in Morgan Drexen’s illegal debt relief scheme) [https://perma.cc/G2P8-
HT7T]. 
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business, which happens regularly, the CFPB usually responds by 
referring the user to the agency’s complaint database or phone hotline.34  
A rare tweet that came close to confrontational, but still could be 
considered educational, was a CFPB response to a Super Bowl 
commercial by Quicken Loans. The commercial advertised a new app, 
Rocket Mortgage, which aimed to streamline the home-buying process. 
The commercial ended with a simple summary of its aspirations: “PUSH 
BUTTON, GET MORTGAGE.”35 Within minutes of the commercial, the 
CFPB had tweeted its advice to “know before you owe,” and provided a 
link to the CFPB’s own suite of decision-aiding mortgage tools, without 
mentioning any company’s name. Quicken Loans shortly thereafter 
tweeted back: “@CFPB We agree. No better way than #RocketMortgage 
for full transparency into mortgage options & info needed to make the 
right decision.”36 The CFPB did not respond.  
To provide some perspective on the CFPB’s Twitter usage, the 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) has tweeted about 2.8 times 
per day since it joined in 2008, almost twice as much as the CFPB’s rate. 
Moreover, the CFPB has not been particularly successful in attracting 
followers, with its 81,000 followers amounting to about one third as many 
as the SEC. As another data point, the FTC tweets considerably more than 
both of the others combined, at about 6.4 times per day. But the FTC has 
the least number of followers of these agencies, with about 55,000.37  
 
~ ~ ~ 
 
Of course, this snapshot of the CFPB’s online tools cannot fully 
assess their effectiveness. It is difficult to know the extent to which the 
CFPB’s tweets, mortgage calculator, and complaint database help cut 
																																								 																				
34 See, e.g., Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau (@consumerfinance.gov), TWITTER (May 7, 
2018, 12:28 PM) https://twitter.com/CFPB/status/993527892339503104 
[https://perma.cc/N7G7-Z24W]. 
35 Quicken Loans, Rocket Mortgage Super Bowl Ad 2016 Quicken Loans, YOUTUBE (Feb. 
8, 2016), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=nXW2BJixXfw [https://perma.cc/QG84-
75EL].  
36 Quicken Loans (@QuickenLoans), TWITTER (Feb. 8, 2016, 8:27 AM), 
https://twitter.com/quickenloans/status/696732072761815040 [https://perma.cc/RX5G-
885E]. 
37 Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau (@consumerfinance.gov), TWITTER, supra note 31; FTC 
(@FTC), TWITTER, https://twitter.com/FTC [https://perma.cc/X2TY-SKQ9]; SEC 
(@SEC_Enforcement), Twitter, https://twitter.com/sec_enforcement 
[https://perma.cc/X29R-BK5B]. Note that these figures do not account for any deleted 
tweets. 
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through—rather than contribute to—the infoglut.38 Still, these activities 
offer at least two takeaways. First, despite being unusually well positioned 
to regulate in the information age, the CFPB has not been particularly 
active, compared to other business regulators, in deploying information 
technologies—with the possible exception of publishing its complaint 
database online. Second, the CFPB’s early experiences demonstrate how 
regulators are increasingly utilizing their own digital tools to influence 
consumer decisions. 
 
III. OPEN QUESTIONS FOR CFPB GOVERNANCE OF FINTECH 
 
Regulators inevitably must decide how to deploy limited resources 
in the face of sometimes questionable jurisdiction. The CFPB has so far 
demonstrated limited appetite for bringing cases and monitoring subtler 
digital harms. The extent of its authority over companies at the fringes of 
consumer finance also remains unclear.  
 
A.  Regulating Seduction by Algorithm 
 
Scholars have shown how firms can exploit consumer psychology 
to increase the prices that consumers pay for various products, such as 
mortgages, credit cards, and cell phones.39 Firms can strategically 
structure their pricing packages with a large number of variables, such as 
data usage, fees, and teaser rates. Due to psychological tendencies and the 
limits of the human brain, this complexity causes consumers to make 
errors in identifying the best choice for them among available options.40  
Firms can engage in a similar kind of “seduction by algorithm.”41 
Tactics include burying the best deal low on a long list of search results; 
not permitting the user to order results based on unit pricing; and 
displaying a price in the search results that is lower than the price that 
most people ultimately pay for normal sizes and colors of that item.42 
																																								 																				
38 On the regulatory problem of infoglut in the information age, see Julie E. Cohen, The 
Regulatory State in the Information Age, 17 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 369, 370-73 
(2016). 
39 See OREN BAR-GILL, SEDUCTION BY CONTRACT: LAW, ECONOMICS, AND PSYCHOLOGY 
IN CONSUMER MARKETS (Oxford Univ. Press ed., 2012).  
40 See id. 
41 See Van Loo, supra note 18, at 1272.  
42 See Rory Van Loo, Helping Buyers Beware: The Need for Supervision of Big Retail, 
163 U. PA. L. REV. 1311, 1311 (2015) (reviewing practices used by Amazon); Van Loo, 
supra note 18 (reviewing the empirical literature). 
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These strategies relate to a broader set of concerns about technologically 
mediated bias.43 
Through its enforcement actions, the CFPB has yet to demonstrate 
a willingness to police these subtler digital tactics. It has not hesitated to 
look at advanced computer modeling when doing so is necessary to 
carrying out its mandate. One of its early enforcement actions dealt with 
bias in a bank’s decision-making model for credit scoring.44 For newer 
digital harms, however, the CFPB has instead stayed closer to a more 
cautious “consumer protection paradigm of notice and choice.”45  
 
B.  Inspection of Algorithms 
 
One of the frequent calls in the literature on governance of 
platforms is for greater visibility into the inner workings of algorithms.46 
The CFPB has the clear statutory authority to examine financial 
institutions’ non-public data, even without suspecting any wrongdoing, 
through its supervision group.47 Supervision is a separate office from 
enforcement at the CFPB. It conducts regular audits of companies, called 
examinations, to check what they are doing. Examiners collect 
information remotely, but also spend a large amount of time onsite, 
sometimes for months at a time at the largest banks.48 
This routine process allows the CFPB examiners to look at a large 
variety of information sources. Most importantly for present purposes, 
their examination manual specifies that examiners can review “computer 
program and system details.”49 The CFPB’s examination activities are less 
																																								 																				
43 See, e.g., Ryan Calo, Digital Market Manipulation, 82 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 995, 1007-
12 (2014); James Grimmelmann, The Structure of Search Engine Law, 93 IOWA L. REV. 
1, 20 (2007). 
44 In the Matter of American Express Centurion Bank, CFPB No. 2012-CFPB-0002, (Oct. 
1, 2012). 
45 Cf. Cohen, supra note 38, at 386 (“[C]urrent consumer protection paradigms framed in 
terms of notice and choice are ill-suited to address these issues, which are fundamentally 
issues of economic and social inclusion.”); supra Part I.A.  
46 See, e.g., id. at 373 (“[P]olicymakers must devise ways of enabling regulators to 
evaluate algorithmically-embedded controls.”); Van Loo, supra note 42, at 1385 
(recommending that the FTC examine the results of some big data analyses). 
47 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, 12 U.S.C. § 5321, 
5322(a)(2), 5491(a) (2012). 
48 See Van Loo, supra note 42, at 1311 (discussing supervision and examination 
functions at the CFPB and contrasting them to the FTC approach). 
49 CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, CFPB SUPERVISION AND EXAMINATION MANUAL 
(Aug. 2017), 
2018 GEORGETOWN LAW TECHNOLOGY REVIEW 543 
publicly visible than its formal legal actions, but they publish summary 
highlights several times a year.50 
A review of these highlight reports indicates that examinations 
sometimes unearth problems in regulated entities’ source code. For 
instance, the agency discovered that “one or more credit card issuers” 
violated disclosure requirements on the forms provided at account 
opening. The report explains that management concluded an employee had 
incorrectly entered the source code used to generate the standardized 
forms.51 In other words, once a problem is spotted the examiners rely on 
the company to conduct an internal review of its computer systems.52 
There is less evidence that the CFPB looks at code or algorithms as 
a regular part of its exams, as it does with various business records. In the 
most recent year of highlights available, 2017, there is no mention of such 
activities.53 It is possible that algorithmic inspections have simply not 
made it into the reports. Regardless, if the CFPB is not already 
undertaking such analyses on its own, its leadership could change that 
policy decision at any point.  
 
C.  Jurisdiction Over Other Platforms 
 
Another open question for the bureau is the breadth of institutions 
that it oversees. Its authorizing statute gives it broad oversight of entities 
selling consumer financial products, such that any business providing a 
consumer financial product or service, or any affiliate of such a business, 
is covered.54 CFPB enforcement authority clearly reaches most of the 
fintech sector, although its supervision authority is more constrained, 
requiring a formal rulemaking process to examine new entities not on its 
original list.55 Fintechs offering solely advice could try to argue that they 
do not fall under the agency’s jurisdiction since they are only offering free 
																																								 																																							 																																							 																														
https://s3.amazonaws.com/files.consumerfinance.gov/f/documents/cfpb_supervision-and-
examination-manual.pdf [https://perma.cc/HP84-DUAL]. 
50 CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, Supervisory Highlights, 
https://www.consumerfinance.gov/policy-compliance/guidance/supervisory-highlights/ 
[https://perma.cc/4JSM-WDCE]. 




53 See CFPB, supra note 51. 
54 12 U.S.C. § 5481(6) (2012). 
55 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, 12 U.S.C. § 5514 
(defining the scope of the CFPB’s supervisory and enforcement powers). 
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information, although that argument is unlikely to persuade given the 
broad statutory language.  
The CFPB’s authority may even reach parts of major companies 
who have developed payment systems, such as Apple, Amazon, and 
Facebook. CFPB jurisdiction over these companies would not 
immediately extend to non-financial matters, such as how platforms 
censor online content or advertise deceptively. Given the CFPB’s recent 
entrance into data security, however, it is possible that in at least some 
areas the CFBP’s ability to monitor could extend into non-financial parts 
of online platforms. Once a platform has taken in consumer financial data, 
the company’s overall data security practices would arguably be relevant 
to any determination of whether Apple, Amazon, or Facebook sufficiently 
safeguard the financial data they collect. Given the FTC’s role in privacy, 
the CFPB would be faced with a potential jurisdiction clash along the lines 
of what some scholars predict will become increasingly common in a 
world in which software infuses most everything.56 Additionally, if 
fintechs sell customer information to third parties, the CFPB could impose 
requirements on how those third parties use that information indirectly, by 
holding the entity that the CFPB regulates—the fintech or bank—




The CFPB is a rare agency that can inspect important algorithms in 
the information age—those in the consumer financial realm. It has already 
undertaken enforcement actions against online consumer financial 
platforms in data security and deceptive practices. And it has analyzed an 
early generation of algorithmic offline harms—bias from credit scoring 
models. At the same time, the CFPB has not yet used its authority to 
pursue the next generation of platform issues that legal scholars have been 
writing about for years, nor does it appear to inspect source code on a 
regular basis.  
																																								 																				
56 Paul Ohm & Blake Reid, Regulating Software When Everything Has Software, 84 GEO. 
WASH. L. REV. 1672, 1695 (2016) (“[R]egulators will engage in new forms of turf 
warfare with other regulators. Without statutory amendment, the boundaries of each 
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between agencies that already compete. . . .Perhaps a single agency—already in existence 
or yet to be created—can track and coordinate the regulation of code across the 
government as well as confront the new challenges posed by the transition of regulating 
software-based objects.”). 
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The CFPB’s early technology activities may look quite different 
from its future. The agency began with a full slate of new rules that it was 
required by statute to write. It also had to build a new program for 
supervising a vast sea of financial institutions, some of which the federal 
government had never supervised. These responsibilities may simply have 
left the agency with insufficient capacity to push further in digital 
oversight. The CFPB’s early activities could mark the first steps in a larger 
evolution needed to address the “existential challenges for regulatory 
models and constructs developed in the context of the industrial 
economy.”57 
On the other hand, the task of regulating consumer financial firms, 
ranging from dispersed payday lenders to the world’s largest banks, may 
prove too consuming for the agency to develop cutting-edge algorithmic 
oversight simultaneously. The CFPB’s light treading so far may have been 
wise, keeping it from overbearing regulatory mistakes that would have 
harmed innovation and consumers. Without evidence that avoidance of 
cutting-edge issues was the result of a deliberate analysis, however, the 
agency’s record indicates the potential value of a technology-focused 
regulator, a kind of meta-agency that would help other agencies, such as 
the CFPB and FTC, to adapt to subtler algorithmic and platform 
challenges.58 Regardless, the agency’s early activities contribute to the 
laboratory of administrative experiments, worthy of study for lessons 
learned and elements of a working blueprint for a broader information age 
regulatory architecture. 
																																								 																				
57  Cohen, supra note 38, at 369. 
58 For examples of such proposals, see, e.g., Ohm & Reid, supra note 56 (exploring 
models and existing proposals for software regulation); Van Loo, supra note 14, at 1267, 
1328. 
